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The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977.1
Its vague provisions initially resulted in only modest enforcement
efforts by regulators, and the law received scant attention from
academics.2  The CRA was reinvigorated in the late 1980s. The
change occurred in part when the statute was amended in 1989,
notably by requiring banks' CRA ratings to be disclosed publicly.3
Perhaps just as importantly, the change occurred as regulators made
enforcement of the Act a higher priority, both before and especially
after the election of President Clinton in 1992.' This second
incarnation of the CRA has created a furor in the banking commu-
nity5 and has attracted a rapidly growing body of academic litera-
ture.6
The time is thus opportune for a critical examination of the
CRA, as Professor A. Brooke Overby performs in The Community
Reinvestment Act Reconsidered.' In this short Paper, I cannot com-
ment on many of the interesting and provocative points made in
Overby's article. Instead, I will consider some implications of two
of her points. First, Overby makes the linguistically surprising
argument that the CRA "has little, if anything, to do with 'coin-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I would like to thank Mary
Ann Case, Paul Mahoney, and Rip Verkerke for comments. Anjana Baluja provided
essential research assistance on the statistics.
'Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2 For an excellent account of the early history of the CRA, see Robert C. Art,
Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One
Decade Later, 18 PAc. L.J. 1071 (1987).
' Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, tit. XII, § 1212(b), 103 Stat. 183, 527 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 2906(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
" See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REV. 787, 854-55 (1995) (describing the Clinton
Administration's efforts to enforce the CRA).
' Professor Overby notes, for instance, that regulators received over 6700
comments on the proposal for revised CRA regulations in 1993. See A. Brooke
Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1433
n.15 (1995).
6 See id. at 1436 nn.27 & 28, 1437 n.30 (citing sources).
7 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995).
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munity. ' ' 8 Overby's examination of the legislative history shows
that the CRA as introduced was targeted especially at disinvestment,
which occurs when the deposits taken from a community are not
invested back into that community.9 Overby shows how these disin-
vestment provisions were largely stripped from the law as enact-
ed."0 The CRA can thus plausibly be understood as primarily
directed toward the problem of redlining, which occurs when banks
or other lenders refuse to loan based on the neighborhood, rather
than on the characteristics of a particular borrower.
This emphasis on redlining, in turn, leads directly to Overby's
second point, that the CRA should be understood as seeking the
goal of equality, and especially equality of opportunity for those
seeking credit." I agree that equality of opportunity provides a
vital reason for supporting the CRA and fair lending initiatives
more generally. This Paper will explore some aspects of equality of
opportunity in lending.
In particular, I will consider the implications of borrowers'
investment in creditworthiness. Part I of this discussion develops
a model showing how borrowers in a group that is discriminated
against will not receive the same return on their efforts to prove
their creditworthiness as other borrowers. The model predicts that
borrowers in the discriminated-against group will, on average, not
educate themselves as much about the financial system and will not
make costly efforts to conform to behavior that lenders prefer.
To get an intuitive feel for the investment in creditworthiness
model, consider a borrower's attitude in two settings-an efficient
lending market that she expects to visit repeatedly versus a
discriminatory market that she believes is likely to deny her credit
in the future. In the efficient market, the long-run advantages of
learning about the financial system and making timely payments are
obvious. By contrast, a person may reasonably decide not to bother
participating in a lending market that seems discriminatory. And,
if a person is in fact approved for a loan in such a market, greater
81 d. at 1438.
9 See id. at 1453-55.
10 See id. at 1455 (stating that the original "reinvestment moorings [of the CRA]
began to crumble").
" See id. at 1497-1505. In this short Paper, I will not try to define equality of
opportunity in any detail. A useful short definition is Rawls' formulation "that those
with similar abilities and skills should have similar chances." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 73 (1971).
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incentives exist to take the money and run, or at least not to strive
so valiantly to pay on time.
Such responses from borrowers can reinforce discriminatory
practices of lenders. This problem of the "self-fulfilling prophecy"
is familiar in redlining discussions. 2 Michael Klausner's contribu-
tion to this Symposium, for instance, discusses two self-reinforcing
effects.' 3 The first effect is based on information externalities.
Where there are few comparable transactions in a neighborhood,
lenders lack needed information about the neighborhood. 4 Lend-
ers thus consider the neighborhood increasingly risky as transac-
tions diminish, and they further reduce their loans there. The
second effect Klausner calls a neighborhood externality-lenders are
reluctant to do business in a neighborhood unless other lenders also
do business there. 5 Any one lender does not wish either to make
all the loans to a neighborhood or to suffer a loss in the value of
collateral when liquidity dries up. Thus, a lender perceives higher
risk when other lenders pull out. As some lenders no longer do
business in a neighborhood, other lenders have a reason to leave,
too.
The investment in creditworthiness model lets us understand an
additional self-reinforcing pattern in credit markets. The model
shows that borrowers in a discriminated-against group have less
incentive to make themselves attractive to lenders. Over time, these
actions by borrowers can reinforce the initial discrimination by
lenders. The result can be a downward spiral in which the discrimi-
nated-against group becomes far less involved in credit markets than
other groups. The investment in creditworthiness model also
reinforces the geographic explanations for self-fulfilling prophecies.
To the extent those geographic explanations depend on borrower
behavior,' 6 the model here gives a more general account of why
"S See, e.g., Donald Phares, Racial Change and Housing Values: Transition in an Inner
Suburb, 52 Soc. Sci. Q. 560, 565 (1971) (describing the self-fulfilling prophecy for
neighborhood lending).
"S See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-
Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1565-
71(1995).
14 See id. at 1569-70 (discussing the "declining spiral" of the home-mortgage
lending market in low-income communities).
15 See id. at 1570-71. The effect may be more precisely understood as a problem
arising from strategic interaction among lenders. See Swire, supra note 4, at 825
(describing how banks' private incentives may lead to a publicly suboptimal level of
lending to a community).
16 See Swire, supra note 4, at 24 (describing the negative effects that owners or
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borrowers in a discriminated-against group would rationally invest
less in creditworthiness over time.
The model of lower investment in creditworthiness would apply
generally to any group that is the target of discrimination by
lenders. The model may be of particular interest, however, when
applied to the experience of blacks in the United States. There is
an unquestioned history of public and private discrimination against
blacks in lending markets.' 7 There is considerable evidence,
although subject to more debate, that lending discrimination against
blacks persists today. 8 In the face of this discrimination, it is
possible that blacks have, on average, reasonably decided not to
enter credit markets as often as whites and have made fewer efforts
to conform their behavior to lenders' preferences.
Part II of this Paper explores some implications of the credit-
worthiness argument as applied to black households in the United
States. Part III presents empirical evidence that supports the
predictions of the investment in creditworthiness model. In 1989,
44.6% of black households had checking accounts, compared to
79.9% of all other households. 9 This Paper presents a series of
regressions showing that race is a highly significant factor in
explaining which households have checking accounts, even after
accounting for relevant economic and demographic variables. The
essential point is that failing to have a checking account would seem
to be evidence of a low level of investment in creditworthiness. The
much higher rate of black households without checking accounts
thus fits the model's prediction of lower investment in creditworth-
iness. Other explanations exist for the data, but it is interesting to
note that many of them presuppose other forms of significant
continuing discrimination in lending markets.
The conclusion returns to the question of equality of opportuni-
ty in lending markets. The investment in creditworthiness model
helps illuminate the difficulty of even approaching that goal.
Rational borrower behavior can magnify the effects of discrimina-
tion by lenders, potentially leading to the self-reinforcing pattern
already discussed. The checking account data, which has not
borrowers who fail to maintain their properties can have on the value of neighboring
properties).
17 See id. at 793-802.
'8 See id. at 806-14.
"9 Interview with Gerhard Fries, Statistician, Division of Research & Statistics,
Federal Reserve Board, in Washington, D.C. (July 14, 1994) [hereinafter Fries
Interview].
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previously been the subject of careful analysis, offers additional
reasons for believing that equal opportunity is not available to
blacks in credit markets today.
I. A MODEL OF UNDERINVESTMENT IN CREDITWORTHINESS
The underinvestment in creditworthiness model draws on the
underinvestment in human capital model developed by Shelly
Lundberg and Richard Startz in employment markets." Lundberg
and Startz's model assumes that workers have both innate and
acquired characteristics that determine their productive abilities.
Each worker acquires human capital to the point where the marginal
cost of more training equals the marginal benefit in the form of
higher wages.2 1 "Human capital" here includes not only formal
schooling, but also, in the words of Kenneth Arrow, the "more
subtle types of personal deprivation and deferment of gratification
which lead to the habits of action and thought that favor good
performance" in a job.2 2
Lundberg and Startz explore the effects on employees of
"statistical discrimination," which involves use of a general category,
such as race or neighborhood, to reduce the costs of particularized
inquiry into an individual's qualifications for a job or a loan.
23
They assume that employers are provided with test scores that
provide information about each worker's marginal product, and that
employers can identify each employee as either white or black.2 4
Lundberg and Startz show mathematically that the wage offered to
a worker will depend on the individual's test score as well as some
20 See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social
Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340 (1983). Lundberg
and Startz develop their model to show the possible efficiency of government
regulation of the labor market. This Paper does not assess the efficiency of
regulation, but instead shows how lower investment in creditworthiness can magnify
the effects of any initial level of discrimination.
1 The marginal cost of investment rises due to "diminishing returns to time and
money spent on training activities and increasing disutility of foregone leisure." Id.
at 343.
2 Id. at 342 (quoting KennethJ. Arrow, The Theoiy of Discrimination, in DISCRIMI-
NATION IN LABOR MARKETS 27 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973)).
2 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theoy of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659 (1972); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 SOc. PHIL.
& POL'Y 22, 26 (1990); see also Swire, supra note 4, at 822 (noting difficulty of
distinguishing profit-enhancing statistical discrimination from profit-reducing taste
for discrimination or from prejudice).
4 See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 20, at 344.
1995] 1537
1538 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1533
adjustment for membership in the group. 5 The source of the
adjustment can be quite subtle-Lundberg and Startz assume that
both groups have the same innate ability and that the test score
gives the same average result. 6 Their model nonetheless shows
the effects of discrimination simply when the random error in the
test score is greater for one group (blacks) than for the other
(whites). 7 Because the test score, on average, is not as precise,
blacks appear riskier to employers; therefore profit-maximizing
employers will offer blacks lower wages.
28
Under the Lundberg and Startz model, white workers will
receive larger raises for increased test scores, as well as higher
average raises.2 9  Because they are more highly rewarded for
improved test scores, white workers will rationally invest more in
human capital-they receive a greater marginal return from each
unit of education than do black workers. Generalizing from the
Lundberg and Startz model, Professor Cass Sunstein explains how
underinvestment in human capital can result whenever significant
discrimination exists in a labor market due to racial animus or
various forms of profit-maximizing discrimination.30  Sunstein
writes: "Decisions about education, training, drug use, tradeoffs
between work and leisure, and employment programs will be
affected by existing patterns of discrimination."31 For example, if
a profession such as medicine is closed to blacks or women, their
expected return from training for that profession will be lower.
A similar pattern can exist in credit markets-it may be that
blacks and other minorities rationally invest less in creditworthiness
than do whites. To understand this possibility, we must first better
understand what is meant by investment in creditworthiness, which
has both an educational and a behavioral component.
The educational component includes information about how the
financial system operates and how to gain benefits by appropriately
borrowing. Aspects of such education might include a working
knowledge of how to balance a checkbook, make a family budget,
shop for interest rates, and assess the tax consequences of various
actions. A consumer must learn how to borrow enough to establish
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
20 See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 29.
31 Id.
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good credit without borrowing more than he can afford. 2 The
potential complexity of the educational task is illustrated by a
borrower on an adjustable-rate mortgage who is faced with a poten-
tially bewildering array of terms for allocating interest-rate risk
between borrower and lender."3 The investment of time and effort
in learning how best to conduct one's personal finances can thus be
substantial.
The educational component also includes learning how to act
after becoming involved in the financial system. Borrowers must
learn what behavior will be rewarded in order to act in ways that
lenders prefer. For example, consumers need to understand the
consequences of actions such as failing to pay debts, writing bad
checks, entering personal bankruptcy, and changing jobs frequent-
ly.3 4 Consumers might benefit from knowing about other behavior
lenders prefer, such as coming forward to negotiate a payment
schedule when full payment is not possible.
The behavioral component of investment in creditworthiness
includes a consumer's decision whether to become involved in the
financial system and how that consumer acts if and when she
becomes involved. The economically rational borrower will weigh
the personal benefits of certain behavior against its costs. Imagine
a borrower facing burdensome payments on a loan. The borrower
may know that making the loan payment will create some incremen-
tal improvement in her credit history. The benefit of that incre-
ment will be weighed against the costs of paying back the loan.
Costs may include the need to scrimp on consumption, work a
second job, borrow money from family or friends, or make other
extraordinary efforts to pay the loan. The tradeoff will typically be
between an improved credit rating in the future (and thus higher
expected future consumption) and increased consumption today.
In short, a borrower's rational level of investment in creditworth-
iness includes a rational level of investment in education about the
2 In modern-day America, this issue can often arise for a young person facing the
freedom of her first credit card without appreciating the difficulty of paying off the
account balance once it has reached the pre-set limit.
" The variety among adjustable-rate mortgages is reflected in their classification
into hundreds of different varieties for purposes of sale on the secondary market.
See e.g., James H. Saft, Fannie Simplifies Classifying of ARM Securities, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 14, 1995, at 17 (Fannie Mae cuts number of subtypes of adjustable-rate
mortgages from 450 to 189).
" See Swire, supra note 4, at 837 (describing recent regulatory initiative to
encourage lenders to be more willing to loan to people who have been steadily
employed but have often changed jobs).
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financial system and a rational level of effort to conform to the
preferences of lenders, notably by maintaining a good credit
record.3 5
The next step in modeling underinvestment in creditworthiness
is to examine the implications of lending discrimination. In the
Lundberg and Startz model, workers decide how much to invest in
human capital, greater investment in human capital leads to higher
wages, and whites get a greater payback from such investment than
blacks.3 6 If the labor market model were transposed exactly into
the credit market, borrowers would decide how much to invest in
creditworthiness, greater investment in creditworthiness would lead
to a lower interest rate on loans, and whites would get a greater
payback from such investment than blacks. The model for credit
markets, however, should be slightly different. A model for who
gets mortgage loans does not usually assume that more creditworthy
borrowers simply get a better interest rate." Rather, the interest
rate is set by the market, and lenders focus on the likelihood of
default.3 8 In the lending model, a borrower will get a loan when
her score on a creditworthiness index is above some threshold (that
is, when the likelihood of default is low enough), and will not
receive a loan when her creditworthiness index is below the thresh-
old. As with the Lundberg and Startz model, assume that whites
and blacks have, on average, the same innate ability and that the test
score gives the same average result.3 9 Also assume that the test for
creditworthiness has a greater random error for blacks, and so they
appear riskier to lenders. Each borrower's index will thus be a
function of his individual score and an adjustment for his member-
ship in the riskier (black) or less risky (white) group. As before, the
average return on investment in creditworthiness will be higher for
-" The Lundberg and Startz model does not include any explicit costs for the
employee analogous to the educational component of creditworthiness. The model
presented here, by contrast, discusses the possibility of significant costs to consumers
of educating themselves about the financial system, including learning what behavior
lenders prefer. The larger these costs, the greater the expected differential
investment in creditworthiness by groups that are the target of discrimination.
36 See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 20, at 344.
" See Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Defaults, Denials, and Discrimination in Mortgage
Lending, NEW ENG. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 45, 47.
38 See id. at 46. The lender would also care about the size of the default if it
occurs. See id. at 46-47.
" If the average score for blacks were lower for some reason, lenders would have
a stronger statistical basis for discriminating against blacks. The difference in
incentives to invest in creditworthiness would also increase.
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whites than for blacks, resulting in a lower rational level of
investment in creditworthiness for blacks.4"
II. EXTENDING THE MODEL OF REDUCED INVESTMENT
IN CREDITWORTHINESS
The previous discussion showed how the model of underinvest-
ment in human capital, based on statistical discrimination by
employers, would apply, suitably modified, in lending markets. This
Part extends that model, showing why underinvestment in credit-
worthiness can occur in situations beyond the specific sort of
statistical discrimination included in the previous model.
One important insight is that underinvestment does not logically
depend on actual discrimination by lenders. Rather, people's
decisions about how much to invest in creditworthiness would seem
to depend on their perception of discrimination, rather than on the
level of discrimination itself." The focus of investment in credit-
worthiness is on the behavior of borrowers, so the beliefs of bor-
rowers determine their actions.
Evidence suggests that many blacks believe significant lending
discrimination still exists. There has been widespread publicity of
reports under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act that blacks with
the same income are turned down more than twice as often for
home mortgages as whites.4 2 Surveys show perceptions of wide-
40 Because of differences in labor markets and credit markets, exceptions to the
predicted underinvestment could occur. In the labor model, greater investment in
human capital smoothly leads to higher wages. In the credit model, by contrast,
greater investment in creditworthiness may or may not result in a borrower's clearing
the threshold score required by a lender. For any given threshold, borrowers who
know the threshold and are near it will have more incentive to invest in credit-
worthiness. If discrimination placed many black borrowers near the threshold for a
category of loan, then the result conceivably could be greater average investment in
creditworthiness.
A different possibility is that discrimination could result in greater investment
in creditworthiness for some blacks. In the face of significant discrimination,
especially when the consumer does not know the degree of discrimination, the only
way to assure oneself credit may be to adopt a "cleaner than clean" strategy that
maintains creditworthiness at or above all likely thresholds.
I do not try to resolve here the question of how, and for how long, perceptions
of discrimination can persist in the absence of actual discrimination by lenders. At
the current time, academic experts are hotly debating the continuing amount of
lending discrimination. See Swire, supra note 4, at 806-14 (discussing empirical
disputes about continuing discrimination). In the presence of such uncertainty, there
is little reason to believe that ordinary consumers will somehow know the "true" level
of lending discrimination.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 65-67 (discussing HMDA data). Lending
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spread lending discrimination." More generally, the clear history
of public and private lending discrimination provides concrete
experiences for many black families that support a perception of
continuing discrimination today."
The history of discrimination is important for another reason.
Creditworthiness, like human capital, is acquired over time and
sometimes over generations. In a family with established credit, a
young person can get advice on how to start a credit history,
cosignatories on a credit card or mortgage, and helpful gifts when
personal resources are not enough to pay the bills. Compare the
family that has experienced discrimination and perceives continued
discrimination: cosignatories are less likely, the young person may
be taught suspicion of lenders, and there may be less willingness to
use family resources in the short run to maintain credit in the long
run. A young person in the latter family is not disadvantaged
simply by being poorer, although past discrimination would tend to
produce lower net worth. She is also disadvantaged because
ongoing discrimination lowers her and her family's knowledge about
the financial system as well as their rational level of effort to
maintain creditworthiness.
45
discrimination and the perceptions of discrimination have been discussed in
numerous recent congressional hearings. See, e.g., Availability of Credit to Minority-
Owned Businesses, Memorandum from Stephen L. Neal, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit
Insurance to Members and Their Staff, Oct. 6, 1994, 1994 WL 738144, at *1 ("Many
Americans believe that minority-owned small businesses face credit availability
challenges over and above those experienced by their majority-owned counterparts.").
" See, e.g., Eugene Carlson, Turned Down, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at R1, R5
(reporting the results of a Roper poll of black business owners finding a perception
of racial discrimination in lending); Jay Mathews, Learning from the Loan Arrangers,
WASH. PoST, July 19, 1994, at C1, C3 (citing examples of profitable black business
people who believe they are facing lingering racism in lending).
44 For instance, prior to 1962-when President Kennedy issued an executive order
to the contrary-"it was required by the Federal Housing Authority that public
housing be classified for occupancy by a particular race." Bradley v. School Bd. of
Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 219 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd
sub nom. School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). An example in the
private sector comes from 1977 training materials issued by the American Institute
of Real Estate Appraisers, which gave the following example of appropriate appraisal
analysis: "The neighborhood is entirely Caucasian. It appears that there is no
adverse effect by minority groups." Art, supra note 2, at 1078 n.26 (quoting
unspecified 1977 training materials of the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers). See generally Swire, supra note 4, at 793-802 (describing history of
lending discrimination).
"' As with family history, the neighborhood of a person can be relevant to their
investment in creditworthiness. To the extent a person lives in a neighborhood cut
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This family situation, and the perceptions of continued
discrimination, are part of a larger set of factors that shape an
individual's decision about how much to invest in creditworthiness.
Whereas the original model showed how lower investment can occur
due solely to statistical discrimination by lenders, lower investment
in creditworthiness can result from any source of actual or per-
ceived discrimination, so long as blacks' expected payoff from
investment in creditworthiness is less than whites.'
Before turning to the evidence about checking accounts,
consider one other implication of the model-it predicts what has
been called the "thicker file" syndrome. 6 Some loan applications
are easily accepted or rejected. For the large middle category, there
is reportedly some tendency for white applicants to have a "thicker
file" than black applicants. It has previously been suggested by,
among others, Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence Lindsey, that
lending officers may work with the white applicants more extensive-
ly, such as by getting explanatory letters for bad credit history or
documenting nontraditional sources of income.47 The investment
in creditworthiness model, in contrast, suggests the possibility that
it is borrower rather than lender behavior that would explain thicker
files. If white applicants expect to get credit, they may be more
willing to build a thick file by investing time and energy in overcom-
ing obstacles. By contrast, if minority applicants enter the process
perceiving that discrimination exists, obstacles may seem more like
pretexts for a loan denial. The perception of discrimination can
once again contribute to differential outcomes. Here and else-
where, my intent is emphatically not to blame any persons for
failure to invest in creditworthiness. Instead, the model points out
rational reasons for less investment by people who actually are or
who perceive themselves to be subject to discrimination.
off from many aspects of the financial system, and dependent instead on pawn shops
and check cashing outlets, it will be more expensive for that individual to learn how
to participate in banks and other principal parts of the financial system.
46 Jim McTague, The Bias Charge Against Banks Hangs on Pretty Slim Evidence, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 26, 1993, at 4 ("There is fairly solid, albeit anecdotal, evidence that
marginal white applicants have thicker loan files than marginal blacks." (quoting
Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence Lindsey)). The factual basis for this statement,
however, has been questioned. See id. ("[flt is absurd and unfair to rely on the case
of one thrift ... to generalize about every depository institution in the country.").
47 See id. (recounting Lindsey's conclusion that banks investigate whites more than
blacks in an effort to find mitigating circumstances justifying a loan to a marginally
qualified borrower).
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III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT CHECKING ACCOUNTS
A. Why Checking Accounts May Be Relevant to
Investment in Creditworthiness
Perhaps the most interesting information about investment in
creditworthiness comes from Federal Reserve data on households
and checking accounts. A nationwide 1989 survey by the Federal
Reserve found that only 44.6% of black households, in contrast to
79.9% of all other households, had checking accounts.4 8 The
regression analysis presented here establishes that race is a
statistically significant factor in explaining who has checking
accounts, even after controlling for such factors as income, net
worth, education, age, and residence in a metropolitan area. This
finding is robust across a range of models.
An important task is to assess the implications of the finding
that race is a significant predictor of which households have
checking accounts. My first claim is that the disparate rate of
checking accounts is evidence of disparate investment in credit-
worthiness. My second claim is that the lower investment in
creditworthiness should be understood as a rational response to
historical or current lender discrimination. Below, I will discuss
critiques of both claims, and I will modify them somewhat in light
of those critiques. Here, I suggest the first claim may be true for
both the educational and behavioral components of creditworthi-
ness.
First, and perhaps most importantly, not having a checking
account may be important evidence of lack of education about the
financial system.49 For those without a checking account we might
imagine a fairly low average level of education about how to get
48 For a discussion of the data provided in the Federal Reserve survey, see infra,
Technical Appendix. Additional information about this survey was obtained from the
Fries Interview. See supra note 19. The nonblack households include white, Asian,
and Hispanic households.
4' The Federal Reserve Survey defined checking accounts broadly to include
conventional checking accounts, NOW accounts, and money market accounts used
for checking. See Arthur Kennickell & Janice Shack-Marquez, Changes in Family
Finances from 1983 to 1989: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 78 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1, 7 (1992).
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loans and maintain a good credit history.5" Substitutes for check-
ing accounts, such as postal money orders or check-cashing shops,
provide a way to conduct individual transactions, but do not teach
a consumer how to maintain the long-term financial relationships
and documentation that are important to lenders. In a world in
which roughly 55% of black households lack a checking account,
and in which 80% of other households have them, the inference that
black households on average have not learned as much about how
to participate in the financial system seems warranted. The results
stay the same when one considers a much longer list of financial
assets, including savings accounts.5
By contrast, having a checking account is evidence of education
about the financial system. The consumer has taken the initial step
to enter a bank and choose the sort of account that she desires.
Maintaining a checking account is itself an educational process,
confronting the consumer with a monthly record of the account,
encouraging the consumer to balance the checkbook, and penalizing
the consumer with stiff fees if she mismanages the account. Having
a checking account may also be an important step on the way to a
consumer's further education about the financial system, opening
the consumer's eyes to additional banking or investment accounts
and services.
Turning to the behavioral component of creditworthiness, the
lack of a checking account itself can affect a person's ability to get
a loan or maintain a good credit history. The lack of a checking
account will typically mean a less clearly documented financial
history, making it more difficult for the borrower to answer a
lender's demands for information. The absence of clear records
that a checking account generates makes it more difficult for a
borrower to keep track of what bills have been paid, increasing the
likelihood of missed payments. Furthermore, getting a home loan
without having a bank account may be prohibitively difficult.
Lenders often require a substantial cash reserve in a bank account
o A person without a checking account, but with the right sort of personal
property, can hope to get a loan at a pawn shop. Such loans, however, do not
typically help establish a credit record and would not seem to provide as much
experience in personal budgeting as the payment of regular loan obligations.
" At least one of a longer list of financial assets was held by 60.9% of black
households and 91.4% of all other households. Fries Interview, supra note 19. The
list included checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, certificates
of deposit, retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, nontaxable bonds, trusts, and "other"
assets. See Kennickell & Shack-Marquez, supra note 49, at 5.
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at the time of closing. Lenders are skeptical of down payments
made with "mattress money"-money whose source before the
closing is not clearly documented. 2 By contrast, a well-maintained
checking account will help show that a borrower's sources of income
are steady and legitimate, and the monthly account statements will
often help answer specific questions posed by lenders. Having an
established bank account can thus be important in a variety of ways
to satisfying lenders' requirements, which comprise the behavioral
component of investment in creditworthiness.
Having a checking account thus seems relevant evidence for
both the educational and behavioral aspects of creditworthiness.
The available data show a very wide gap between blacks and whites
with regard to maintaining checking accounts. 3 A chief goal of
the statistical analysis presented here is to determine whether the
lower rate of checking accounts for blacks is explained by economic
and other factors that happen to be correlated with race. A first
step is to see whether race is an important factor after correcting
for economic variables-income and net worth-that one would
expect to be linked to having a checking account. Black families
have lower average incomes than other American families,5 4 and
" SeeJames H. Saft, GE, 1st Interstate Negotiating Leeway on Iffy Loans, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 31, 1994, at 10 ("Mattress money is funds that do not come from bank accounts
or other easily traced sources. Lenders shy away from mattress cash-often used by
immigrant borrowers-for fear that it may actually be a loan."). An additional
concern with mattress money is that it implicates money laundering restrictions on
the use of cash. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring reporting
to Internal Revenue Service of cash transactions in excess of $10,000).
" The raw data in the 1989 Survey data showed that 50.9% of black households
and 93.5% of white households actually sampled had checking accounts. See infra
Technical Appendix. These results overstate the actual levels of checking accounts,
because the Survey over-sampled from high-income households. See Kennickell &
Shack-Marquez, supra note 49, at 17. The Federal Reserve has estimated that 79.9%
of all nonblack households had checking accounts in 1989, compared with 44.6% of
black households. Fries Interview, supra note 19. A similar 1992 Federal Reserve
Survey found that 93.1% of white households had transaction accounts, but only
67.5% of "Nonwhite or Hispanic" households, including black, Hispanic, or Asian
families. See Arthur B. Kennickell & Martha Starr-McCluer, Changes in Family
Finances from 1989 to 1992: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 80 Fed. Res.
Bull. 861, 869 (1994). The comparable figures for 1989 were similar: 92.3% for
white households, and 63.7% for Nonwhite or Hispanic households. See id. at 868.
White households thus had higher rates of checking accounts than the combined
population of Hispanic and Asian households, who in turn had higher rates than
black households.
' The mean income for black families in 1989 was $19,800 and the median was
$12,000. By comparison, the mean for all other families (including whites, Asians,
and Hispanics) was $38,000 and the median was $26,800. Fries Interview, supra note
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the net worth of black families is even lower.55 Perhaps, after
correcting for lower income and net worth, black families are as
likely as white families to have checking accounts.
The statistics do not support such a conclusion. The regression
in Model 1, as reported in Table II of the Appendix, shows that race
is statistically significant in explaining checking accounts at the one
percent level.5" Income and net worth are similarly significant,
although the coefficient for the race variable is greater than for
either income or net worth, indicating that an increase in the race
variable creates a greater increase in the likelihood of having a
checking account.
5 7
A similar situation exists when one adds other variables that
might be thought important to predicting whether a family has a
checking account. In every regression run, race was statistically
significant at the one percent level.5" Other variables that were
always significant at the one percent level were increased income,
increased age, and increased education. 9 Net worth was some-
times significant at the one percent level and sometimes at the five
percent level.6 0 The presence of a married couple in the house-
hold was significant at the five percent level.6 Current employ-
ment for the head of the household was sometimes significant at the
five percent level.62 Living in a metropolitan area was not statisti-
cally significant.6 3
B. Criticisms of the Link Between Checking Accounts
and Investment in Creditworthiness
The Federal Reserve data appear to establish that race is a
significant factor in predicting which households have checking
accounts. A low rate of checking accounts is itself evidence of low
19 (describing results of 1989 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances).
s The mean net worth for black families in 1989 was $45,900, and the median was
$4,000. By comparison, the mean for all other families was $203,800 and the median
was $58,500. Id.
' See infra Technical Appendix (Table II). Significance at the 1% level means that
there is less than a 1% chance that the result was due to chance, rather than to an
actual effect of race on having a checking account.
s7 See id.
" See id.
5 See id.
o See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
See id.
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investment in creditworthiness-consumers without checking
accounts are unlikely to be lenders' favorite customers. The large
gap in checking accounts between black and other households is
also what might be expected under the model developed in Part I
and extended in Part II-lender discrimination or the perception of
lender discrimination may have produced a rational response by
borrowers in the discriminated-against group, magnifying the effects
of any initial discrimination.
The next task is to examine criticisms of the link between
checking accounts and investment in creditworthiness. One sort of
criticism goes to the quality of the data. As discussed in the
Appendix, there are imperfections in the data used for the regres-
sions. Although the Survey data is excellent in many respects,64
any conclusions must be treated with caution until other data sets
have also been examined. The other categories of criticisms
examined here are that the Survey omitted important variables, or
that alternative hypotheses might explain the data better than the
investment-in-creditworthiness model.
One criticism of the results reported here might be that the
apparent correlation between race and checking accounts may be
due instead to other variables not included in the data set. A
similar criticism has been made about the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act (HMDA) data, which indicate that blacks are turned down
for mortgages more than twice as often as whites with the same
income. 65 The HMDA data omit factors relevant to lenders such
as credit history, employment history, and net worth.66 Conse-
quently, the data have been justifiably criticized as providing a weak
basis for assessing discrimination in mortgage lending. Compared
with the HMDA data, the Federal Reserve survey used here to
examine checking accounts is relatively immune to the omitted
' See infra Technical Appendix; see also supra note 53 (showing how differences
in rates of checking accounts are large and consistent in Federal Reserve surveys over
time).
"The latest HMDA figures are reported in Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore,
Home Purchase Lending in Low-Income Neighborhoods and to Low-Income Borrowers, 81
Fed. Res. Bull. 71, 100 (1995) (noting that 34.0% of black applicants were denied
credit for conventional home purchase loans in 1993, compared with 15.3% of white
applicants).
"See, e.g., Benjamin Zycher & Timothy A. Wolfe, Mortgage Lending Discrimination,
and Taxation by Regulation, REGULATION, No. 2, 1994, at 61, 64-65. However, the
well-known study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found evidence of disparate
treatment even after correcting for variables omitted from the HMDA data. See
Overby, supra note 5, at 1450 n.81.
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variable critique. Detailed information on many relevant character-
istics is included in the data set, and the correlation with race is
robust across a variety of models.
67
Some potentially important variables, however, were not
included in the Federal Reserve data. For instance, blacks may have
fewer checking accounts due to a lack of financial institutions
offering checking accounts in predominantly black neighborhoods.
We might therefore wish to have data on accessibility to financial
institutions. Alternatively, checking accounts may on average be less
useful to blacks: perhaps vendors discriminate and are less likely to
accept checks written by blacks, or perhaps more blacks live in
neighborhoods where many vendors do not accept checks. We
might therefore wish to have data that reflect the usefulness to a
consumer of having a checking account. If these categories of data
were available, we might find that the racial differences in having
checking accounts would diminish or disappear.
In considering these omitted and potentially important variables,
one notable feature is that they all rely on the assumption that
blacks lack an equal opportunity to participate in the financial
system. The core task of the CRA involved remedying the reduced
availability of financial services in black neighborhoods. The refusal
of vendors to accept checks written by blacks clearly violates
antidiscrimination laws and deprives blacks of an equal opportunity
to participate in transactions. The existence of black neighborhoods
where vendors are disproportionately unwilling to accept checks, by
assumption, means that blacks on average lack the opportunity
others enjoy to use checking accounts and develop experience with
financial services.
Additionally, all of the omitted variables, to the extent they are
significant, may themselves be caused by a lack of investment in
creditworthiness. That is, these potentially important variables may
in part be the result of the magnification effect, where an initial
level of discrimination was reinforced by rational borrower decisions
not to invest in creditworthiness. Financial institutions may have
abandoned a neighborhood because of a lack of borrowers who had
invested sufficiently in creditworthiness.6 8  Profit-maximizing
67 As shown in the Technical Appendix, the results reported here show that race
is a significant variable after correcting for a substantial number of economic and
demographic variables. The three regressions reported in Table II are a subset of a
substantially larger number of regressions actually run on the data, all of which found
race to be significant at the 1% level. See infra Technical Appendix.
' As Klausner describes in his Paper, a low level of transactions in a neighbor-
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vendors could refuse to accept checks from blacks if their experi-
ence showed that blacks were less creditworthy, where the lower
level of creditworthiness could once again be due to blacks' rational
response to discrimination.6 9 The existence of neighborhoods
where merchants do not accept checks could also occur because
consumers there have not invested as much in creditworthiness,
creating a downward spiral where few vendors accept checks so few
consumers get checking accounts so even fewer vendors have reason
to accept checks.
These potentially important, omitted variables thus may be
significant in part because of rational lack of investment in
creditworthiness by consumers who experience discrimination.
There is also reason to question whether these variables, rather than
the creditworthiness model, explain the large differences in rate of
checking accounts. Each of the omitted variables raises empirical
questions of its own. Consider the theory that the lower rate of
checking accounts for blacks is due to financial institutions'
decisions about where to locate offices rather than borrowers'
decisions to invest less in creditworthiness. One recent study of
financial institutions in Chicago for 1970, 1980, and 1990 found that
"when relevant economic and demographic variables are accounted
for, the racial and ethnic composition of a community's population
is not significantly related to the number of financial institution
offices." 7° No one study can show a nationwide pattern of geo-
graphic access to financial services, but to the extent that the results
of their study are generally true, the lack of financial institutions in
predominantly black neighborhoods would not explain the much
lower rate of checking accounts held by black households.
Similar empirical questions confront the theory that checking
accounts are less useful on average to blacks. It may be fruitful to
test the possibility that vendors discriminate against accepting
checks from blacks. One model here could be Ian Ayres's study of
discrimination in the purchase of automobiles, in which matched
hood can lead a profit-maximizing lender to refuse entirely to lend in that
neighborhood. See Klausner, supra note 13, at 1570-71.
"' Refusal to honor checks written by blacks, of course, could also be due to
prejudice.
70 George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, The Geographic Distribution of Financial
Institutions in Chicago, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Jan-Feb. 1994, at 10, 25. The authors,
however, caution against drawing general conclusions from their data: "The findings
of the study are preliminary, apply only to Chicago, and cannot be generalized to
other urban areas." Id.
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testers were sent to purchase new cars, and significant differences
were found in the prices charged to women and minorities.
71
Matched testers might similarly try to use checks to pay for goods
and services. As for the possibility that blacks simply live where
vendors do not accept checks, more empirical work would need to
be done about geographic patterns of check usage. This geographic
effect may be limited because many large vendors, such as utilities
and large stores, have standard policies on accepting checks,
irrespective of the residence of the consumer.
The discussion of omitted variables highlights the possibility that
factors other than race explain the large differences in rates of
having checking accounts. My response is that the variables may not
be empirically significant; to the extent they are significant they may
in part be caused themselves by lower investment in creditworthi-
ness, and if they are significant they show a continuing lack of
equality of opportunity.
The final criticism of the link between the checking account data
and the investment in creditworthiness model accepts that race is a
significant variable in explaining which households have checking
accounts. This criticism offers an alternative theory that explains
the significance of race by asserting that blacks simply have a lower
taste for checking accounts, perhaps because, on average, they have
some aversion to doing business with largely white-owned financial
institutions. For instance, blacks might prefer not to have checking
accounts at banks out of a distaste for past discrimination by these
institutions.
In response to the taste theory, it is important to distinguish
between blacks' internal tastes or preferences and their responses
to external factors. The analysis here has focused on how external
factors would influence a borrower's decision to have a checking
account or otherwise invest in creditworthiness. These many
external factors include the borrower's facing racial discrimination,
earning lower income, or having less geographic access to financial
services. Changes in the external factors lead to predictable
changes in investment in creditworthiness. Differences in tastes are
an important explanation of behavior only when one holds constant
the effects of external factors. One of those external factors is
whether the consumer is facing discrimination (or, equivalently for
n See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1991).
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our purposes, whether she perceives that she is facing discrimina-
tion). An aversion to banks based solely on a dislike for their
historical practices would be taste-based, but an aversion based on
perceptions of continuing discrimination would not. The model
developed in this Paper emphasizes the external factors. This
approach is consistent with usual economic practice, which generally
assumes that different groups have similar tastes. 2 The emphasis
on external factors also makes sense where the gap between rates of
checking accounts is so large. Vague references to differences in
taste seem ill-suited to explaining such a large variation."s
CONCLUSION
Lending discrimination discussions to date-understandably so
in light of the history of discrimination-have focused on the
behavior of lenders. Individual consumers, however, react to the
situations in which they find themselves. Where they are facing
lending discrimination, it is predictable that they will adapt their
behavior. The model of lower investment in creditworthiness shows
how an initial level of lender discrimination can prompt less
investment in creditworthiness by those who are discriminated
against. Borrower reactions magnify the effects of lender discrimi-
nation. This lower level of investment in creditworthiness can
reinforce profit-maximizing discrimination by lenders or invidious
racial stereotyping, as rational action by borrowers can produce
differences over time between groups.
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Two factors reinforce this magnification effect. First, borrower
reactions depend on the perception of discrimination, rather than
7 See GeorgeJ. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV., Mar. 1977, at 76, 76 (arguing "that tastes neither change capriciously nor
differ importantly between people").
7' Similar responses apply to the possible theory that blacks have fewer checking
accounts because on average they are "irrationally" failing to invest in creditworthi-
ness. Irrational action is used in the economic sense of failing to achieve an
individual's goals as efficiently as possible. Once again, economists would be
reluctant to believe that large populations will differ substantially in their internal
characteristics, such as taste or rationality. To give weight to the irrationality theory,
economists or others would need to see advanced a particular explanation of why the
black population on average would be less rational in achieving its goals than other
groups. In addition, an explanation based on the internal characteristic of rationality
is ill-suited to explaining the large variation in rates of checking accounts.
7" See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 30-31 (discussing the synergistic effects of racial
animus, rational discrimination by employers, and lower investment in human capital
by employees).
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
on discrimination itself. Second, creditworthiness, like human
capital, is acquired over time and sometimes over generations. Put
together, these two factors can lead to long-lasting effects on
borrowers in a group that has been the historical target of discrimi-
nation. Even if lenders today no longer discriminate, the percep-
tion of discrimination can persist and borrowers in that group can
face greater obstacles to achieving the educational and behavioral
components of creditworthiness.
In applying the model to the United States, it is difficult to show
empirically that differences in lending outcomes today are due to
rational, lower investment in creditworthiness by blacks over time.
As a first attempt to apply the model, this Paper has presented
evidence based on the strikingly lower level of checking accounts
now held by black households. The checking account data seem to
indicate that black households today do invest less in credit-
worthiness-fifty-five percent of black households, as compared with
twenty percent of all other households, do not take even the initial
step into the financial system that a checking account represents.
The regression analysis in this Paper presents new information
about the checking account data, namely that race is a highly
significant predictor of having a checking account, after correcting
for a range of economic and demographic variables.
A more difficult issue is whether the low rate of checking
accounts is due to lower investment in creditworthiness or to other
explanations, such as a lack of financial institutions in predominant-
ly black neighborhoods or a lower average usefulness of checking
accounts for blacks. In examining these other explanations, this
Paper gave reasons for thinking that they may not be empirically
significant. To the extent they are significant, they may in part be
caused themselves by lower investment in creditworthiness. These
other factors, however, may indeed explain some of the difference
in rates of checking accounts, and continued research would be
helpful in sorting out the relative contribution of the other
explanations and of investment in creditworthiness.
In the context of Overby's call to reemphasize equality of
opportunity in financial services, the checking account data may be
quite informative about the continuing lack of such equality. It
seems unlikely that the strikingly different rates of checking
accounts are due to blacks' simply having different tastes than
whites, with those tastes unaffected by discrimination. The other
apparent explanations for the checking account data all speak to
continuing inequality of opportunity: lender discrimination
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magnified by lower investment in creditworthiness, fewer financial
institutions in black neighborhoods, or lower average usefulness of
checking accounts for blacks.
It is beyond the scope of this Paper to explore the policy
implications of the investment in creditworthiness model. As a
general matter, however, the model underscores the importance of
educating consumers about financial services. Policy proposals
might include government efforts to train consumers in how to use
financial services, or giving full CRA credit to loan counselling
programs and other outreach efforts.
In her article, Professor Overby helps us see the extent to which
the GRA seeks the goal of equality of opportunity in lending
markets. Equality of opportunity is historically linked to assuring a
decent education for all people. The investment in creditworthiness
discussion shows how a decent education in financial services may
be more important than previously realized.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A. Data
The data on checking accounts come from the 1989 Survey of
Consumer Finances (the Survey), conducted for the Federal Reserve
Board by the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan." The Survey sampled 8148 households. The data
presented here include only households responding to the race
classification question as white or black. Those responses indicating
Asian or Hispanic and those not responding to the race classifica-
tion question were excluded. The data presented here also exclude
responses to the Survey that were incomplete with respect to other
variables reported in the regression results. The results presented
include a total of 1960 responses.
In addition to race, the Survey data provide information about
respondents' finances, human capital, and other demographic
characteristics. The financial variables include income and net
worth. The human capital variables include education (whether a
person has completed high school), age (human capital increases
with age), and employment (whether the head of household is
currently employed). The other demographic variables include
whether the household is headed by a single person, whether the
household resides in a metropolitan area, and whether the head of
the household is male. Because less than 1% of the responses
reported a female head of household, that statistic is not reported,
nor was it statistically significant in any regression run.
Table I reports the frequencies for all the categorical variables.
Note that the checking account variable actually measures whether
the head of the household has a checking account. It is theoretical-
ly possible that another member of a household has a checking
account even though the head does not, but for expositional
convenience I generally say that the household has a checking ac-
count.
" The design of the Survey is described in Kennickell & Shack-Marquez, supra
note 49, at 17-18.
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TABLE I
VARIABLES USED IN THE MODELS
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION ] VALUES AND FREQUENCY
Race race of the head of the 0 - white (94.6%)
household 1 - black (5.4%)
Single whether the household 0 - married (96.6%)
contains a married 1 - single (3.4%)
couple
Metro Area metropolitan area or 0 - metro (91.5%)
rural 1 - rural (8.5%)
Employment whether the head of the 0 - yes (79.4%)
household is currently 1 - no (20.6%)
employed
Education whether the head of the 0 - yes (84.8%)
household has com- 1 - no (15.2%)
pleted high school
Checking whether the head of the 0 - no (5.6%)
Account household has a check- 1 - yes (94.4%)
ing account
A potentially significant aspect of the data is that the proportion
of black households to white households changes due to incomplete
responses to the survey. Of the 2865 surveys of white and black
households, black households comprised 10.7%, and white house-
holds comprised the remaining 89.3%. For all surveys used in the
regressions (the 1960 of those 2865 that responded to each of the
questions), the black households comprised 5.4% and white
households comprised 94.6%. The Federal Reserve, in reporting the
proportion of black and all other households who had checking
accounts in the 1989 Survey, used complex techniques for imputing
responses to unanswered questions. For the regressions reported
here, there was no similar way to use the incomplete surveys.
The black households included in the regressions were different
from the full set of black households. For all 2865 black or white
households in the survey, 50.9% of black households and 93.5% of
white households had checking accounts. Indeed, blacks without
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checking accounts were 5.3% of the 2865, while whites without
checking accounts were only 5.8%, even though whites constituted
89.3% of that population. For the 1960 households used in the
regressions, 75.2% of black households and 95.5% of white
households had checking accounts. Blacks without checking
accounts were 1.3% of the 1960 households, while whites without
checking accounts were 4.2%.
In short, the proportion of blacks with checking accounts rose
in the population used for the regressions, while the proportion of
those without checking accounts who were black fell. Both of these
changes would tend to make race a less significant predictor of
which families have checking accounts. Thus, the regressions
reported here tend to understate the significance of race.
It is possible, however, that the failure to give complete answers
to the Survey is somehow correlated with other financial or
demographic variables. If so, it is possible that those other variables
would gain explanatory power if all black households were included
in the regressions and race would become less significant.
B. Regression Results
Table II reports the Probit estimates of determinants of a
household having a checking account. The dependent variable is
equal to unity if the household has a checking account, and equal
to zero if it does not. The Probit coefficient and t-statistic are
reported. A range of regressions was run using both the Probit and
Logit methods, but the results were essentially the same using either
method. Only Probit results are presented here.
Of the larger set of regressions actually run, three are presented
in Table II. Model 1 includes only race and the financial variables
of income and net worth. Model 2 adds the human capital variables
of age, education, and employment. Model 3 adds the demographic
variables of sex, marriage, and metropolitan residence. All three
models provide the same high level of predictive success, accurately
predicting between 1846 and 1848 out of 1960 results. The signs of
the coefficients were all in the direction that theory would predict.
That is, the variables that one would expect to produce more
checking accounts actually did.
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TABLE II
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD CHECKING ACCOUNT1
6
MODEL 1: MODEL 2: ADD MODEL 3: ADD
VARIABLE NAME FINANCIAL HUMAN CAPITAL DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLES VARIABLES VARIABLES
Race -0.83 -0.75 -0.77(-5.50)'" (-4.77)*" (-4.88)'"
Income 0.38 0.32 0.32(8.97)'* (6.67) °"  (6.55)'"
Net Worth 0.34 0.25 0.25
(3.51)" (2.18)' (2.23)'
Age 0.27 0.24
(5.86)" (5.23)"
Education -0.80 -0.77
(-6.29)" (-5.99)"
Employment -0.34 -0.31
(-2.12)' (-1.91)
Single -0.45
(-2.19)'
Metro Area -0.59
(-0.35)
Constant -2.44 -2.69 -2.18
significant at 5% level.
significant at 1% level.
N = 1960; positive observations (N) = between 1846 and 1848
The regressions support the hypothesis that race is a significant
explanation for whether a household has a checking account. Race
was statistically significant at the 1% level for all regressions run.
The coefficient and significance of the race variable was invariant to
76 Table II reports Probit coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). A variable
for sex was included in the equation for Model 3, but was not reported.
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different combinations of included and excluded independent
variables, and thus appears to be robust to model specifications.
Of the financial statistics, income was statistically significant at
the 1% level for all models. Net worth was significant at the 1%
level in some models, and the 5% level in others. Of the human
capital statistics, age and education were statistically significant at
the 1% level for all models. Employment was on the borderline of
being significant at the 5% level. Of the demographic statistics,
marriage was statistically significant at the 5% level. Residence in
a metropolitan area was not statistically significant in any model.
The very small number of female-headed households in the sample
led to the exclusion of that variable from the reported results.

